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1 The kind reader should be informed that the following text includes extensive endnotes which were of course not 
given at the talk. These notes represent what I cut out in order to respect time, they are important commentaries or 
elaborations. Nevertheless, the reader can simply follow the main text without diving into details.
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1 Introduction
My entrance to the issue of the dialogical self  is language.  Not discourse, not language-in-use: 
language. 
I am intrigued by the way language works, I ask  how language does what it  does: constructing 
realities and forming a world view (Weltansicht),  and,  first  of  all:  how does it  enable a self  to 
perform her or his self. Asking these kind of questions, I view language as a formative phenomenon, 
with a genuine part, a life, in our psychological beingness – this is coupled with a clear rejection of 
the notion of language as a tool. 
I am attached to Humboldt's philosophy of language, where language is conceived as  energeia: a 
„being-at-work“ or „doing-ness“, usually translated by the term “activity”. We are subjected to that 
activity, and we do it at the same time – so, toolness coupled with simple agentivity is not possible, 
rather a receptive doing that forms and transforms the doer in each performance. So, a very specific 
kind  of  activity:  it  is  situated  between activity  and passivity:  this  is  what  indeed characterizes 
human activity.i
Through Humboldt,  I  am also  attached to  early  Soviet  investigations  of  language  (Jakubinskij, 
Vološinov, Bachtin, Vygotskij), all champion the view of human beings' mediatedness by dialogic, 
sociocultural language, a multivoiced phenomenon (not a tool: Vygotskij).ii Taking both traditions 
togetheriii permits,  first, to  go beyond simple  toolness  and into  dialogical  dynamics,  second, it 
allows to incorporate form. 
With this view, performance gains a specific taste: language activity is form, not a formless flow of 
meanings, but meaningful form, individuated and made certain. Forms are then forms to go through, 
to experience as a meaningful passage one is in and traverses.iv
What I would like to offer you today is an exploration of that „being-at-work“ or „doing-ness“ of 
language. In a way, this exploration leads to something simultaneously obvious and veiled: 
“There are two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the 
other way, who nods at them and says, »Morning, boys. How's the water?« And the two young fish 
swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes, »What the hell 
is water?«” v
I take water to be language-as-activity, and I follow partly that metaphor: I appreciate the notion of 
language  as  element,  taken  for  granted,  just  because  we  are  immersed  in  it:  we  take  our 
“swimming” as an activity we do by ourselves – not realizing that it is precisely swimming and not 
flying or running. But: language is not water. It is not a natural, pre-given element to our beingness: 
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it  is  a  socio-cultural,  historical  artifact,  a  construct  we  did  and  constantly  do  by  our  very 
“swimming”: It is as if the fish “do their water” by their swimming, nevertheless needing the water  
to swim and to be fish.
Swimming-languaging: for Humboldt language is activity, it exists as address and reply. Humboldt 
turns the picture  around and put the ever-becoming as starting point  to  conceive language: the 
spoken word is what is givenvi, and language is a dynamic and dense reality which is concretely 
occurring. Hence, it becomes a presence in the here and now of any language activity, a particular 
“third  party”,  located  at  a  kind  of  mid-level,  which  is  neither  completely  individual  nor  fully 
abstract. It is closely bound to form, or to “per-forms”.
Several  scholars  are  formulating a  kind of  thirdness  that  reaches beyond the inter-subjects  and 
introduces  a  third  or  mid-level  located  before the  macro,  abstract  social  level.  The  main 
preoccupation seems to be how to articulate the individual with the social, giving stability the way 
to dynamics and vice versa. Interestingly, form plays a role.
I propose to question that meso-level through some of its descriptions in the literature, and through 
its phenomenal traces. Having addressed the notion of the Third itself, I will close my talk with a 
glimpse into “Excentricity”.
2 The Mid-Level or Third
2.1 Descriptions and Labels
In the context of the preoccupation I just mentioned, one can find descriptions that explicitly aim at 
a middle located between the social and the individual selves. 
An urgent plea for a involving a mid-level  within the frame of dialogical research is  found in 
Grossen  and Salazar  Orvig  (2011).  They address  the  issue  of  alterity  as  “made through social 
dimensions  that  go  beyond  interpersonal  relationships”  –  these  social  dimensions  include  “an 
institutional dimension” (p. 497). With the term “institution”, the authors aim to account for the 
stability of the self, because by their rules, norms, procedures, routines etc., institutions are able to 
confer  stability  and  continuity  to  interpersonal  relationships.  Stressing  that  institutions  are 
constructed and transformed by concrete social actors, the authors introduce  a “third dimension”. 
The personal dimension refers to the individual's uniqueness, the interpersonal dimension refers to 
“the  collective  construction  achieved  by  interactional  dynamics”,  the  transpersonal  dimension 
enables the apprehension of a social dimension that “refers  neither to interpersonal relationships, 
nor to abstract and de-contextualized social values and rules” (p. 498, italics mcb). Hence, a subject 
can simultaneously be conceived as unique, concretely involved in interpersonal relationships, and 
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symbolically related to broader communities. Interestingly, the term introduced is borrowed from 
Clot  (2008)  who  applied  it  to  analysis  of  professional  work  practices:  here,  the  transpersonal 
dimension refers to a professional genre. Let me give you the definition: 
“A professional genre is a set of activities that has a history in a certain work community […] and 
forms a  repertoire of expected actions.  It  frames each individual's  professional  practices and is 
transpersonal because the workers recognize it as a collective property with socially shared values. 
[It] has a  psychological function in a worker's activity: by regulating his or her activity within a 
wider professional field, a professional genre links him or her to a community of workers and acts 
as psychological resource” (Grossen & Salazar Orvig, 2011, p. 498, italics mcb).
Moore, Jasper and Gillespie (2011) comment Grossen and Salazar Orvig (2011) and also address 
the issue of stability through institutions. In order to elaborate the transpersonal dimension, they 
propose Goffman's frame concept: frames link the social world to the structure of the dialogical self. 
Actions  within  one  frame  tend to  stabilize  the  dialogical  self,  whereas  being  “caught  between 
frames tends to destabilize the self” (p. 510). Hence, frames as relative stable institutional forms are 
necessary  to  the  dialogical  self,  the  passage  between  forms  seems  to  be  formless,  therefore 
dangerous. 
Another description is owed to narrative studies: De Fina (2013) recently stressed that positioning 
analysis “offers a middle ground between approaches to identity that keep a very narrow focus on 
the  here  and  now  of  interactions  […]  and  orientations  that  focus  much  more  on  wide  social 
processes such as the circulation of ideologies” (2013, p. 43, italics mcb). De Fina goes on to say 
that this “middle way” is theorized by Bamberg's (1997) level 3 positioning. Level 1 refers to the 
way characters in a story are positioned to each other, level 2 refers to the positioning processes in 
the story-telling world (real interlocutors), and level 3 explores “how the speaker/narrator positions 
a sense of self/identity with regards to dominant discourses and master narratives”, and how s/he 
“makes this relevant to the interaction in the here and now” (Bamberg, 1997, p. 385, 391): hence, in 
level 3, the interlocutors relate themselves to the social in terms of dominant discourses, they make 
it relevant now. De Fina underscores that a third level is necessary to deal with how interlocutors 
negotiate less locally produced identities.vii
The labels  so far  are:  the transpersonal,  third dimension; the middle ground and the level 3 of 
positioning. The concepts are enrolled in order to provide for the connection between the social and 
the individual. The function of the third or mid-level is to confer the self stability through stable 
forms (frames, dominant discourses), simultaneously leaving enough space to be unique.viii Further, 
the  third  dimension  mediates  the  social  and  the  individual  to  each  other,  so  that  the  social  is 
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concretely  present within the  individual,  without  incorporating  it.  The  “grain  size”  of  that 
transpersonal or mid-level is invoked through terms like institution, community, and practices: more 
proximal and more graspable social forms than “the social” as such.ix 
2.2 Traces
Having briefly located and described the mid-level as a kind of thirdness, I will now turn to the 
traces of the meso-level. From the standpoint of language-as-activity, my leading question is: 
 How does the meso-level, or the transpersonal, talk, how does it sound? 
Note  that I am not asking for a third party as an “additional other”x coming to Me and You, and 
located at several levels of abstractions, including remote or potential audiences, possible future 
gossipers, professions and institutions, constructed collectives, super addressees, and generalized 
others (Linell, 2009xi): Me + You + ThirdParty.
Rather, I ask precisely for the meso-level articulating the Individuals with the Social (not: the Self 
to the other Self) so: Self-Other-Related Selves – MesoSocial. As that kind of level, it is associated 
to an institutional level, what Linell calls “Socioculture”, linked with “we” or “one”, French “on”, 
German/Swedish “man”, and generic “you”: the voice of this specific instance is my interest, that is, 
the forms one can observe as connected to that mid-level, sometimes coming as third. My collection 
of traces is very selective.xii
My first illustration is Georgaca's (2012) precise look at the dialogue between client and therapist, 
where the therapist is thematized as real addressee of the client's talk, as a counter-position to the 
client's  position,  and – just  appropriate  to  my subject  – as an  institutional  role.xiii Commenting 
analysis of therapeutic sessions by Martinez, Tomicic and Medina (2012), Georgaca addresses the 
therapist's activities: the therapist operates as medium by conveying the client's statements back to 
him, he is positioned as a conveyor of the client's words, “attributing thus the authorial position of 
his statements to the client” (p. 164, italics mcb), and by constructing himself as a  witness of the 
client's problems and change, he validates the client's new position.xiv So:  medium,  conveyor of  
words, witness of change, and authorial position: Because of this shift to an institutional function, 
the voice of the therapist has a specific weight, this voice can ennoble the client's words by taking 
them up  and  given  them back.xv Georgaca  further  stresses  that  the  form internal  and  external 
dialogues  take  are  “dependent  upon  the  constellation  of  dominant  and  culturally  legitimate 
perspectives on the world and the self” (p. 166); Georgaca urges to analyze how “formative and 
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normative aspects” of psychotherapy are “actively played out and pursued in the minutiae of the 
therapeutic exchange” (p. 167): this echoes Bamberg's (1997) level 3, and addresses concrete forms. 
Martinez  et  al.  use  the  same method as  Georgaca  (Dialogical  Discourse Analysis),  and  so are 
attentive to the therapist's performances, in that particular case how he manages episodes of rupture 
in the therapeutic alliance.xvi Here is the beginning of a fragment which is part of an episode of 
rupture. The client wants to quit the therapy. The therapist says: 
1 T1: “...I would have to be honest to tell you that, in this jo::b(.) we 
2     sometimes see   with a certain frequency that, when somebody  
3     feels better, just like  in medicine when one   feels better  one says it's 
4     ENOUGH, so to speak, right?...” bu::t but to me this not me::e:: I believe 
5     tha::t you are reproducing a mechanism of yours ok?(.) to be actually 
6     working and suddenly ok? You say (finger snap) I quit!! 
(Martinez et al, 2012, p.111, without category indicators; bold by the authors, underlined mcb, line 
numbering mcb)
Following Martinez et al, in line 1 the therapist first uses a deontic modality: “ I would have to be” 
and a modalizer “to be honest”: the therapist positions thereby himself as “a trustful person that 
speak from a ‘must be’” (p. 112).xvii That the must-be is for me already the indication of an instance 
enacted  by  “the  job”  and “we”:  I  think  we see  and  hear  the  professional  genre speaking,  the 
transpersonal  instance of Clot (2008) and Grossen and Salazar Orvig (2011).  This seems to be 
confirmed by the authors' analysis: in line 1 and 3 (bold) the therapist brings in “a third party” that 
comes from outside the actual relationship: “this job”, “in medicine”, and that has a generic form: 
“we”, to which the indefinite words “somebody” and “sometimes” also belong: so he speaks here of 
very general occurrences, to which the client is an instantiation: as a result, the relation between Th 
and Cl broadens, they become more distant to each other: the therapist shifts his position from the 
here-and-now particular Th to a representative of the third “the job”, which is psychotherapy.xviii The 
Th  positions  his  client  by  saying:  “we sometimes  see  with  a  certain  frequency  that,  when 
somebody feels better”. After that performance of the institutional position, the Th goes on to enact 
the “general client's” voice: “it's  ENOUGH”xix, returning then to his own voice, so the distance 
between Th and Cl is reduced to their usual one. Now the Th utters the core of his statement: the 
reason to  not  quit.  His  final  argument  is  again  the  performance  of  a  voice:  that  of  his  client, 
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accompanied by the finger snapping which is iconic of the “suddenly”: “(finger snap) I quit!!”. So, 
we have here an impressive shift between voicings in one personxx which is also  a shift between 
kinds of  performances,  invoking different communities of  language practice  with their  common 
history and language forms (Clot's work communities) .xxi 
I  take  my  second  illustration  from  De  Fina's  transcripts,  an  extract  of  an  interview  with  a 
Salvadoran women (Francisca),  focused on her experience with learning English when she first 
arrived from El Salvador. F's narration is about the different ethnic groups at the school she was 
attending, and the problems she experienced. The core of the interview is a story:
De Fina (2013), S. 49-51 (mcb: line numbering, interlinear arrangement, and alignment of English 
to Spanish lines, and bold):
1  A: tu te acuerdas de algo que en ese periodo alguna cosa específica que te haya pasado? 
A: do you remember something that in this period anything specific that happened to you? 
2 F: oh si, si me me (h) me: uh- 
F: oh yes, yes I (h) I uh- 
3      la primera palabra que que yo aprendí acá era stink, 
     the first word that I learned here was stink,
4 A: stink. 
A:  stink. 
5 F: porque una una niña de- una afro nina afro americana estábamos en el 
F: because a girl a girl from- an African American girl we were in the 
6    baño y yo estaba lavándome las manos y estaba s fleche ola, 
  bathroom, and I was washing my hands and I was alone, 
7    y sí me agredieron y me dijeron “You stink”, 
  and they did attack me and they told me “You stink”, 
8     y entonces yo me quedé con eso en la en la en la mente, 
   and so I stayed with this in the in the in my mInd, 
9     y cuando yo le fui a preguntar a una amiga que hablaba un poquito más de   
   and when I went to ask a friend of mine who spoke a little bit of 
10     inglés, 
   English
11    y me dijo “oh eso quiere decir que tienes mal olor que tu que tu hiedes o 
   and she told me “oh that means that you have a bad smell that you 
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12    algo así” hhh 
   smell bad or something like that”, [hhh]
13    entonces y eso fu(h)e la primera palabra que yo aprendí, 
   so and that wa(h)s the first word that I learned, 
14    y entonces ya pus uno se empieza como a intimidar más también quizás, 
   and so then one starts to become more intimidates as well may be, 
15    porque prácticamente yo no les estaba hacienda nada, [...] 
  because practically I was doing nothing to [them]2 [...]
De Fina's analysis at level 3 uses only some introductory utterances by Francisca, that reproduce the 
dominant  views  about  hierarchies  among ethnic  groups  by  the  order  of  their  naming:  Whites-
Asians-Blacks-Latinos. De Fina also points to the shift from singular to plural: “a girl” and “they”, 
(l.  5  +  7),  but  without  further  explanation.  I  would  like  to  look at  this  shift,  which  is  indeed 
remarkable, together with the voices enacted at lines 3, 7, 11-12. 
In my reading, the shift to the plural is due to a shift from a particular person to an instance, namely 
to the third or dominant Discourse,  that  considers that  ethnic groups on a lower level then the 
speaker stink, and that “one” (!) can, or even should, say the words “You stink!” when addressing a 
member of that group: this is the accepted, specifically embodied wording. So, I would say that F is 
shifting because she perceives that something more than the particular girl facing her is attacking 
her: a racist discourse – again invoked at the end by the pronoun “them” (l. 15).xxii Further, there is 
this “more advanced” friend speaking, voiced by F in line 11-12.xxiii
So, “you stink” has a history within the narration: it was said to F in the story, explained to her by a 
friend, and re-invoked as paradigm of her English learning for the interviewer: This language form 
travels from speaker to speaker, changing its status: as tag of the dominant Discourse, as the subject  
of a metalinguistic dialoguexxiv, and as  abbreviation of F.'s start in the US. From the “tag of the 
dominant Discourse” interpretation we could infer that it has a longer history: it came “from the 
top”, and traveled “down” through all verbal aggressions persons suffer from and do to another 
person (+ body aggressions).xxv Hence, the attack F. endured was an attack perpetrated by the girl as 
representative of the third – which is not an excuse, but may contribute to clarify how structural 
violence also works.
2 In the original: „her“, but Spanish „les“ is plural, so I corrected to „them“. The laugh particle in line 12 are not 
reproduced in the translation by De Fina (2013).
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I will conclude my illustrations with an example from my research group.xxvi We work with video-
confrontation,  where  the  researcher  and her  subject  watch  together  an  activity  that  subject  did 
before and which was videotaped. The dialogues that take place during the video-confrontation are 
investigated. 
Tures' (2014) investigation is located in the field of education, she works with students of early 
pedagogy. The students videotaped their language activities with children at a day care center, these 
videos are then used in a video-confrontation session with the teacher. Here is an example of such a 
video-stimulated  reflection. D = trainer  +  lecturer  of  Do  =  Doris,  student  (italics  at  l.  11-14: 
perceivable change in voicing; bold: mcb) 
1 D (nickend) mhm mhm 
(nodding) uh uh
2 (blickt auf Bildschirm) und sie hatten ja auch in der ersten 
(looks at the screen) and you actually said in the first 
3 videoreflektion auch gesagt 
video reflection 
4 (blickt zu Do) dass das kind ja so im alltag auch anders wahrgenommen wird
(looks at Do) that the child is perceived differently in daily routine
5 Do hmm (blickt zu D, nickt) 
uh-uh (looks at D, nods)
6 D als eben sprachlich nicht dass es sich nicht so äußert 
precisely not for her language, that she is not expressing herself very much
7 D (nickt) 
(nods)
8 D habe ich das noch richtig in erinnerung (langt sich ans Kinn) 
do I remember that correctly (touches her chin)
9 Do genau (nickt) 
exactly (nods)
10 (blickt zu D) also sie wird als 
(looks at D) so she is [perceived] as
11  ja sie kommuniziert gar nicht im kindergarten (.) 
well, she doesn't communicate at all at the kindergarden
12 weder mit anderen kindern 
neither with other children 
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13 sie beobachtet nur 
she only observes
14 und spricht eigentlich nicht 
and doesn't really talk
15 D hmm (greift sich an den Hals) 
uhu (touches her throat)
16 Do (blickt nach unten) und die erzieherinnen sind der meinung 
(looks downwards) and the teachers have the opinion
17 D (wendet sich von Do ab und schreibt) 
(turns away from Do and writes)
18 Do (blickt wieder zu D) dass sie keine ganzen sätze sprechen kann 
(looks to D again) that she is not able to speak in complete sentences
19 D mhm //(beginnt leicht zu lächeln//, blickt auf zu Do) 
uhu //(starts to smile//, looks to Do)
20 Do (blickt wieder zu D) dass sie keine ganzen sätze sprechen kann 
(looks to D again) that she is not able to speak in complete sentences
21 D mhm //(beginnt leicht zu lächeln)//, 
uhu /(starts to smile)//,
22 Do //(beginnt zu lächeln)// und 
//(starts to smile)// and
23 D (//blickt auf zu Do//.) 
(looks up to Do//.)
24 Do //dann// denke ich immer 
// then I always think
25 /(lacht)// sie kommt rein wow 
//(laughs)// she comes in wow
26 D //(lacht)// 
//(laughs)//
27 Do und sie fängt an mit einem kompletten satz gleich mal (schwungvolle, 
wegwischende Geste mit Arm) und ja (Schulter zucken) 
and she starts right away with a complete sentence (swinging, wiping away 
gesture with the arm) and yes (shrug of the shoulders)
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Here, we have the clash of two different thirds, each with a certain opinion about children's correct 
speech. The first one pertains to the culture of practice at day care centers, the second one belongs 
to the university culture of research and teaching – the student travels between theses cultural and 
language spaces (and has to act rightly for each). Both thirds have their preferred language forms. 
Their clash is manifested in how a specific child is categorized and perceived, both stances are 
enacted by the student.xxvii The culture of practice is voiced by Do in line 11-14: she shifts in voice 
quality. She enacts the team of teachers, who themselves are  representatives of the third of their 
community. Its core dogma is uttered twice, in an almost identical repetition at lines 18 and 20: it is 
just said, not voiced by a marked shift; it is a well-known formula in Germany, said to children by 
teachers “Sprich in ganzen Sätzen!” (“Speak in complete sentences!”) with a specific intonation, 
and transmitted through generations of teachers and also parents.xxviii
The dogma is finally transposed into an embodied, freeing gesture at the end (l. 27), the child is put 
on the scene (beginning with l. 25), the evaluative “wow” announces a positive surprise, or the 
entry of a star, and then Do enacts what the child does bodily: wiping away the critical third – hence 
giving way to the alternative one.
2. 3 Third: Sharpening the Notion
What I put together with these illustrations are some slight traces of an instance which is  not a 
person, but has a central part in the positional and polyphonic dynamics of the dialogical selves' 
language activities. With the language-as-medium perspective, I will try to sharpen the notion as I 
understand it. 
Marková (2006) addresses very similarly a specific kind of third party as an “inside feature of 
dialogue”, one of the core topics of dialogical and dialogue studies, having a long past already, 
Bakhtin  (1986)  is  of  course  one  of  the  main  figures  here.  Marková  describes  that  third  as 
“traditions,  institutions,  friends  and  colleagues,  political  parties  and  so  on,  who speak  through 
dialogical participants. Speakers may explicitly or implicitly refer to those who are not physically 
present in dialogue […] conversation is conceived as being penetrated by a number of visible or less 
visible  Alter who communicate through the mouth of speakers” (p. 133). I feel very near to that 
description, but I think that the aspect of “speaking through” has to be differentiated, it is a crucial 
point:  what kind of relation do speakers-listeners have to the third? And thus also: what kind of 
status does the third have?
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Firstly, I would like to highlight the specific character of the third as I understand it: 
it is  languaged (sprachlich), so it is not a list of particular persons and social institutions: not an 
Alter (it is upstream to these). Secondly, the third I mean is not simply “referred to” or “expressed”. 
What is at stake is a presence here-and-now, not an invocation of a pre-given, but an in-vocation 
giving the third a voice, and that is: giving oneself a voice,  that “kind of voice”. It is a  living-
through: think of the water the fish do by their very swimming (medium-ness). 
So, this is the kind of presence I am at, a presence the subjects are within, at the same time doing it. 
That  presence  transforms  the  Me-You-dyad  and  the  Me-You-Third  Parties-triad  into  Me-You-
Others-within-the-Third. Being “within”, the subjects' “doing” shows that particular quality: it is 
active-passive.xxix Further, the third which is present as performed in language activity is not sheer  
dynamics, rather it is formsxxx – hence, the third exists as plurality: this is why we can speak of 
different thirdS.
I am interested in  the specific languaging of thirds as it is enacted either in verbal forms, or in 
voicings, or both – saying: “this is how one/we say that and listen to it”, and this has a particular 
sound. As Georgaca (2012), I would like to observe how a third is “actively played out and pursued 
in the minutiae of the [...] exchange” (p. 167) – played out in  language activity. The thirds I am 
looking  for  are  communities  of  professional  speakers-listenersxxxi: The  connoisseurs in  such 
communities are those who are allowed to particularly represent the thirdxxxii, to speak or listen and 
evaluate as its representative. Speakers-listeners are  at the same time these biographically unique 
selves and representatives of their common Third. And this is precisely how language as medium 
comes to be present.xxxiii 
I follow the same idea as Grossen and Salazar Orvig looking for a level “before” the abstract. So, 
the third that I conceive is bound to a community, it is present, and at the same time transgressing 
the very Now and the very Individual. I think this is possible because of the objectifying power of 
symbolic language. 
3 Excentric Selves: A Glimpse into Plessner's Anthropology
3.1 A Different Anthropology
This is a glimpse into Plessner's  philosophical anthropology, a framework I myself just started to 
study, because I think it offers a fruitful base for the conception of the modern subject – or person, 
in Plessner's term. This base could permit to refine the core concepts needed for a non-Cartesian 
subject. 
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Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985) was a German philosopher and sociologist – under the Nazi's regime 
he was forced to flee and stayed from 1934 until  1943 in Groningen, then went into hiding in 
Utrecht and Amsterdam until the end of the war.
Plessner's philosophical anthropology is different from usual anthropology to several respects. 
One of  these  is  that  Plessner's  study of  the  human being  is  not a  study of  the  members  of  a 
biological species, but the study of “corporeal personhood.”xxxiv All human beings count as persons, 
a human being is a person: this hints to a specific break of modern politics vis-à-vis feudalism: In 
pre-modern times, not all human beings counted as persons (e.g. slaves, women) the person status 
was granted by some pre-ordered instance (God, the King, Nature). For this reason, Schürmann 
(2014) calls Plessner's philosophy “a philosophy of modernity, because it is a philosophy of the 
public”, where “the public [is a ] space of shelter”.xxxv
For Plessner, persons are beings of nature, meaning: 1) that they are more then cultural beings, 2) 
that they are grounded, not celestial beings – they are grounded in their modernism, which does not 
involve a pre-ordered instance that grants their personhood.xxxvi
3.2 Excentric Positionality 
The  basic  phenomenal  situation  of  human  beings  is  formulated  by  Plessner  in  the  following 
way.xxxvii On the one hand, we perceive ourselves from without, as if standing beside ourselves, 
moving through a scenery. On the other hand, we are able to relate and focus everything that we 
encounter  to  the  position  of  our  body-ness  (Leiblichkeit),  from where  we express  and act  and 
wherein  we  experience  (erleben):  we  can  completely  merge  into  that  focus,  so  it  is  as  if  the 
possibility  of  realizing  that  we  are also  able  to  see  ourselves  from another  point  of  view has 
disappeared. This is where excentricity dissolves into recentricity: the relationship between the two 
forms of centricity is for Plessner formulated as the problem of the limit (Grenzproblem). 
The term “limit” is a core one: it distinguishes anorganic from organic, living beings: 
Whereas anorganic bodies only have a boundary (Rand), more or less their ending, living beings 
have a limit (Grenze) which they “manage”, or “cultivate”, by themselvesxxxviii:  this very specific 
relationship of living beings to their limit is for Plessner “positionality”. Living systems thus take a 
position,  at  the  same  time they  are  set  (gesetzt),  that  is,  they  do  not  owe  their  existence  to 
themselves: hence positionality is not an active setting, but being-set: positionality has a passive 
dimension, which lays the ground for any I-construction or We-construction: it can precisely not be 
set by an I or a We.xxxix
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 So, persons not only live and experience (leben + erleben), they experience their own experience 
(Erleben erleben): there happens a turning point, a transition (Umschlag) from being in one's body-
ness to being outside one's body-ness: this is the irreducible dual aspect of human beings' existence, 
it is a true break with their nature – and, as said, human beings live on this as well as the other side 
of the break (Plessner, 1982, p.10).xl
In Plessner's understanding, it is a third that permits and enables the distinction: this third is the co-
world (Mitwelt).xli The Third is  not an own, powerful sphere where unity is effected, it is not the 
“reconciliatory third” – rather: it is the break, the rupture itself, the “empty crossing” mediating the 
dual aspect.xlii Human beings, persons, realize their own limit, they are able to perform the passage,  
simultaneously  keeping  the  sides, hence  realizing  a  paradox:  being  themselves  and  not  being 
themselves, and a tautology: being themselves and staying with that beingness. xliii 
From these relationships, Plessner derives a threefold positionality, saying that the person is 1) the 
body, 2) within the body (internal life of the soul), and 3) outside the body as a point of gaze (ein 
Blickpunkt), from where it is 1) and 2). Hence, there is the outside world (Außenwelt), the inside 
world (Innenwelt), and the co-world (Mitwelt). 
 The co-world does not surround the person (as nature does), nor does it fill the person (as the inner 
world does), rather, it supports the person by being simultaneously supported and formed by her.xliv
The notion of the co-world does not start with the “I”, on the contrary: the self-reflecting self is an 
experience that is  bound to the existence of other selves, the self experiences herself as self  and 
equally as member of the co-world. The relationship to oneself and to the outside world is mediated 
and constituted by the co-world.xlv
3.3 A Reading
I think you have heard some of the central motifs I advocated for: the passive-active dimension, the 
necessity of other selves to be a self, the importance of the body, and also the idea of a movement, 
here as passage as turning point and break. I would like to propose the following reading.
The  break  that  is  given  with  to  the  dual  movement  excentric-centric,  could  be:  language  as 
energeia,  an  activity,  a  movement,  which gives  the  passage  between  excentric  and  centric 
positionality  a  dynamic  form.  This  is  due to  the  specific  character  of  the  language  sign  to  be 
reversible. That means: We can direct language to ourself: so reflection is a movement that leads to 
oneself via Alter and language, it is therefore a socially lived languaged contact to others.xlvi
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Further, I take the “point of gaze”, where from the person is the body and within the body, also as a 
point of listening – I depart from the visual metaphor and take the point as a point of  listening-
gazing: this could be the co-world as witness, who enables by its gazing-listening to turn away and 
to  return  (ex-  and  recentering  movement).  It  enables  the  stability  within  the  paradox  and the  
tautology of being self: not being self – staying self. 
But what struck me deeply is Plessner's description of the co-world: “it  supports the person by 
being  simultaneously  supported  and  formed by  her”  –  this  rejects  the  pre-given  power,  and  a 
controlling, wonderful I as constructor. There is a relationship at stake, which is for me very much 
an echo of the medium as I described it at the beginning of my talk: language is a deeply socio-
cultural,  historical  artifact,  a construct  we did and constantly  do by our very “swimming”,  i.e.  
languageing.  In  my reading then:  the co-world needs  a  formation for  its  supporting and being 
supported: this could happen in language-energeia.
4 Conclusion3
1: Public Self
To be a public self is to be in excentric-centric movements, bound to the body, experiencing a self 
mediated  by  the  co-world.  Language  as  language  of  others,  and  as  language  beyond 
instrumentality – energeia – is necessary to that movement.
2: Polis
I could well use Clot's professional genre as given by Grossen and Salazar Orvig (2011) for what I 
call  (with  the  Greek  word  for  the  city-state)  “polis”  –  that  community  of  speaker-listeners 
performing specific language practices. 
Original:
“A professional genre is a set of activities that has a history in a certain work community […] and 
forms a  repertoire of expected actions.  It  frames each individual's  professional  practices and is 
transpersonal because the workers recognize it as a collective property with socially shared values. 
3 In the given talk the conclusion included the core statement #1 and two pictures symbolizing the meso social, which 
are not rendered here. Instead of the pictures I offer – complementing #1 – the conversion of Clot's (2008) definition 
of a professional genre (as given in 2.1 following Grossen & Salazar Orvig, 2011)  into the definition of a polis as 
community of speaker-listeners – which I could not give in the talk for reasons of time constraint. 
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[It] has a  psychological function in a worker's activity: by regulating his or her activity within a 
wider professional field, a professional genre links him or her to a community of workers and acts 
as psychological resource” (Grossen & Salazar Orvig, 2011, p. 498, italics mcb).
Conversion:
 (my replacements and additions underscored): 
The polis frames each self's language practices and is transpersonal because the speakers-listeners 
recognize it as a collective property with socially and pragmatically shared values. They recognize 
it  through their  specific doing-living,  thereby making it  present as this  polis.  They are not just 
acknowledging and expressing it, they are per-forming it now as   in situ   formation.  A polis has a 
psychological  function  in  the  activity  of  the  speakers-listeners:  by  witnessing  this  activity, it 
regulates his or her  individual and social  language activity within a wider professional field  of 
“language connoisseurs”, a polis that links him or her to a community of speakers-listeners and acts 
as psycho-social resource.xlvii 
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i Feuerbach, Leont'ev, see Schürmann (2008).
ii See Bertau (2011): “Vygotsky developed the idea of the psychological tool in the years 1927-1929, leading […] to 
the account of the development of higher psychological functions from lower ones through the mediation of 
psychological tools (Vygotsky 1930/ 1997; Vygotskij 1931/ 1992). The mediational process itself was thus 
Vygotsky’s first interest, not yet the means of this process. […] Self-regulation is thus in the first instance conceived 
as self-control, and control is mastering others and oneself, and language is the master’s tool. […] Vygotsky 
formulates self-control differently from the 1930s on. This crystallizes in giving up the tool metaphor for language, 
and it coincides with Vygotsky’s increasing interest for the means of mediation, for the ‘meaning volume’ of the 
word. Vygotsky realized that the psychological tool, i.e. the word, has an inner side, leading him to the basic 
assumption of the developing relationship between a sign and its meaning. ” (pp. 23-24). 
I think that the most crucial point in this turn to the dynamics of language itself is the non-coincidence between the 
psychological and the grammatical plane: “Lack of correspondence means that what is said (i.e. expressed in 
grammatical categories) does not necessarily correspond to what is meant [on a psychological 
plane/psychologically]. ” (Bertau, 2014 in press-b)
Furthermore, the form dimension is urgently needed to complete that dynamics: Vološinov is here the one to invoke: 
the form relates to the social, non-verbal. It has an important part in the intricate dynamics between word and 
thought: not vesting the meaning, having its own value (Friedrich, 1993).
iii Especially by articulating Vygotsky and Vološinov with each other.
iv Forms a beginning, an end, and a specificity in terms of sounds, rhythms, positionings, tempi, tensions.
v These are the first, famous words of David Foster Wallace, given at a commencement speech in 2005, at Kennyon 
College, Ohio. Cited following D. F. Wallace, 2012, p. 39.
vi Not only given, but kept, not lost, not given up. By the couple ergon-energeia Humboldt links himself to the notion 
Aristotle formed in order to grasp a very specific kind of activity in his discussion of the problem of becoming and 
change: it is an intense, present and dynamic form of reality (see Bertau, 2014 in press-a).
vii  The mid-level is necessary also in order to “find a balance between a recognition of the relative freedom of 
positioning that individuals have in interaction and the appreciation of processes of ‘enregisterment’” (p. 43, italics 
mcb). So, there is also freedom and constraint to relate.
viiiGrossen & Salazar Orvig (2011) name also “material aspects”: even more stable and concrete forms for the self. 
ix Bamberg's (1997) dominant discourse seems to be of a larger grain size, nevertheless it points to specific discursive 
realities within a society.
x Third parties as additional others: Linell, 2009, p. 103, also p. 95.
xi See Linell, 2009, pp. 95-105. 
“Potential audiences”: these are the “invisible third party” of Salgado and Hermans (2005), forming a triangle: I – 
Other – ThirdParty: where the personal meanings of I and Other are negotiated. In this description, I miss form, only 
the level of meaning is addressed; furthermore, it is not the third party as such that mediates, but language-as-
activity: in plural forms pertaining to different poleis. So, it is not the audience as such which is important, but the 
fact that the audience is languaging. In the authors' notion of subjectivity, the voice is seen as a tool “by which the I 
establishes a specific relationship with another”, at the same time, the person is subjectively instituted, so that 
subjectivity becomes “a relational or dialogical production”: yes, but “voice” is a languaging body, and language as 
the objectifying Third instance is missing. (see Salgado & Hermans, 2005, p. 11)
xii See Linell, 2009, p. 95. It is interesting to observe how different languages articulate the Sociocultural not only 
through personal pronouns, but also reflexive pronouns: French: “ça ne se fait pas!”, Italian: ”non si fare!”, but 
German “das sagt man nicht!”
xiii  Here, Georgaca (2012) points to the necessity for any analysis of psychotherapy to “be attentive to the ways in 
which the institutionally prescribed role of the therapist is enacted in the therapeutic exchange” (p. 166). I 
completely agree.
xiv  I would add: he validates the new position as new, as right in line with the agenda they both have, namely a specific 
development of the client.
xv The prerequisite to this is that both accept the agenda (the client's/child's/pupil's/apprentice's development in a 
certain sense).
xvi  In two such episodes Martinez et al observe that “the therapist tend to involve a third party [...] to give objectivity to 
the relationship” (p. 111, italics mcb)
xvii I add here: that “must be” serves to linder the face-threatening-act that the therapist is going to enact: “you are 
reproducing a mechanism of yours”. Note how many hedges this utterance gets: e.g. the lengthening in “not me::e:: 
” l.4, the tag questions and pauses in l.5: “ok?(.) and l.6: “ok?”.
xviiiThe meaning of this professional instance is even consolidated by the comparison “just like in medicine”: medicine 
is still much more valuated than psychotherapy. (We can assume that through the this invocation, the distance 
between Th and Cl. is even more broadened.) 
xix Again with two hedges: so to speak and tag question: gain acceptance and understanding. I see that voice as the 
particular client's voice, Th enacts a reported speech as summary of what is essentially said by the client (see 
Tannen, 1989, p. 113: “summarizing dialogue”).
xx  These are: the institutional third = enacted linguistically – to the general client = v1; the Th = v2 to his actual client 
= v3; the actual client to his therapist = v4. 
xxi The community of psychotherapists and doctors (accompanying healing processes, with their agenda); the 
community of the therapist's colleagues, the community of those speaking with that kind of finger snapping. The 
community of those often speaking with reported voices. And the very small community of Th-Cl: their history. But 
it is always MORE: they have language forms.
The Th could have said: “look, the other day when you felt better, it was the beginning of a new vision on your 
work, remember? You said Oh my Go::d, it feels so easy to go there now, I have a light feeling inside my belly!” 
With these forms, the Th would have done something else, he would have performed a different self in relation to 
his client's self, who is differently positioned and experienced. But what the Th does here, is to speak as the third, 
with the third. My point is not the rhetorical effect of the form, it is its formative effect for selves, its dynamics for 
the selves who are always subjected to the language per-forms.
xxii One could say that F. shifts for rhetoric purpose, e.g. to amplify her story, make it more dramatic, but I think she 
would have marked this in a more hearable way, the pronouns and verb forms are quite a discrete means, and do not 
seem to be. 
xxiiiThe friend is more advanced in English and also with respect to hierarchical level: I infer this from the laugh 
particles, which could display a non-empathic position with F in the story. For this, I assume that the laugh particles 
belong possibly to that voice and not to F-the narrator. 
xxivThis metalinguistic discourse is focused on its situational meaning (“you have a bad smell”).
xxv I think that it originates in the white Discourse saying that all Non-Whites are uncivilized, i.e. not washed savages, 
and therefore stink.
xxvi See the detailed studies by Karsten (2014) and Tures (2014).
xxvii Whose evaluative positioning of herself vis-à-vis these thirds is encouraged, or co-positioned by D (e.g. the smile 
episode). I see D and Do acting as accomplices, constructing their positioning as a counter-position to the “wrong 
third”, hence themselves belonging to the right one: they recognize each other. See Gee's (1999) term the “real 
Indian” as paradigm for the members of communities who recognize each other as “real member”; certain 
procedures are necessary to test if someone belongs to someone's own third or not; and to which degree that person 
is nevertheless acceptable.
xxviii That stance is no more taken by professionals in research and teaching at universities.
xxix Or: receptive-active (empfangend-aktiv)
xxx It is form as formations, meaning a dynamics made certain. This is exactly the relationship between dynamis and 
energeia. See Bertau (2014 in press-a).
xxxi The professionals admit novices, educate them how to speak-and-listen-and-voice correctly (writing-reading).
xxxii Specific status of connoisseurs.
xxxiii Thus, the third as I understand it is not an Alter, because no self could take its position, it can only be re-
presented. 
xxxiv “leibhaftige Personalität”, Schürmann, 2014, p. 16
xxxvSchürmann, 2014, p. 11: “Schutzraum”: the citoyens (citizens) let each live, but are not indifferent to each other. 
Their relationships are indirect: against the “cult of community”: urban society – a style (Sainte-Beuve).
xxxvi See Schürmann, 2014, p.16-17: “Dass Personen, anthropologisch gesehen, Naturwesen sind, ist also das Credo, 
und dabei muss man zweierlei mithören: Sie sind i) mehr als bloß Kulturwesen, und sie sind ii) irdische, und nicht 
himmlische, geerdete, und nicht ätherische Wesen.”
“More than cultural beings” means: human beings are embedded in a more extensive nature than they themselves 
are. The specificity of activity-passivity is related  hereto:  “der Lebensvollzug erweist sich […] als eigentümliche 
Mitte von Aktivität und Passivität” [the carrying out of life proves itself as peculiar middle between activity and 
passivity] (Schürmann, 2011, p. 192). For this reason, personhood is a crucial point of discussion: coma patients, 
clones etc.: the fragility of personhood is exactly due to the fact that there is no “given rule”, no instance to free us 
from discussing and deciding – the outcomes could be wrong. This is what became clear with the civic revolution 
(bürgerliche Revolution).
A further point is worth mentioning: Plessner's philosophy is “sovereign”, because it knows its own conditionality, it 
does not hold the own philosophy as the proper and real one – so it is thinking with a standpoint, see Schürmann, 
2014, p. 25. It is to be aware of one's own “coordinate system”. This means not the least a rejection of analytical 
philosophy, that does not acknowledge that a scale of validity is never given, but a “free layout” (freier Entwurf) 
(Schürmann, 2006, p. 86).
xxxvii I follow Krüger (2006).
xxxviii These are Gerhardt's words: “Während anorganische Körper lediglich einen Rand haben, an dem sie mehr oder 
weniger zu Ende sind, haben Lebewesen eine von ihnen selbst bewirtschaftete Grenze” (2003, p. 39), found in 
Schürmann, 2011, p. 192.
xxxix See Schürmann, 2011, pp. 192-193.
xl  To experience the own experience is to become aware of one's self, to experience oneself (sich erleben). Following 
Plessner, the animal lives (also) from a center and into a center, but it does not live as center, so its own being-a-self 
remains hidden to the animal. Although the animal forms a self, it does not experience its self (“aber es erlebt nicht – 
sich”), see Plessner, 1982, p. 9. 
xli The point is here, that this co-world would be of no help if only on this or that side of the limit, it could not permit 
the passage – the movement. See Krüger, 2006, pp. 166-167.
xlii  Plessner, 1982 p. 11: “das leere Hindurch der Vermittlung”. Human beings live as body (1), as soul (2), and (3) as 
the psychophysic neutral unity of these spheres.
xliii Krüger, 2006, p. 170.
xliv Plessner, 1982, p. 14: “Die Mitwelt trägt die Person, indem sie zugleich von ihr getragen und gebildet wird.”
xlv  See Lindemann, 2011, p. 596-597.
xlvi Generally: Self has a contact to herself, Self is a self to herself via Alter in the medium of language as energeia. See 
Bertau (2014 in press-a).
xlviiThe resource lies particularly in polyphony, see Bertau (2013).
